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Reception Communities

Political and media discourse analysis and
review of public opinion

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POLAND

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1. Migration issues in public discourse before the “refugee crisis”

Before the outburst of so called “refugee crisis” migration issues had always been in the shadows of the mainstream social problems. Analysis of this debate is however essential to understand how the migration issues were used to do politics in Poland and how they are linked to the public opinion’s view on migrants, refugees and minorities. Furthermore some of this debates were essential to secure the win of Law and Justice Party in the 2015s general elections and secure its high poll position until present.

It is obvious that attitudes towards foreigners are shaped by numerous of factors including demographic, economic, cultural, historical political and social indicators. The type of social relations in this area will be decisive to the general social climate for the migrants in particular country and the way they are treated in public sphere and in private relations. As Rajzman and others are commenting, until today nor academics or policy makers have reached a consensus why natives are viewing immigration as threatening and why otherwise similar, but settled in different countries people, tend to vary greatly in their opinions, even

after controlling for socio-economic differences (Raijman et al. 2003). Generally attitudes towards minority groups can be classified into three groups: cognitive (reflecting stereotypes and cultural perceptions), affective (reflecting prejudice), and behavioural (reflecting discrimination and violence or support and acceptance) (Kourilova, 2011). The attitudes to other people varies also by age, gender, education and social status of the person. Individuals with all their personal experiences, personalities and social position are exposed however to cultural and political climate in the local context or nationwide. Markaki and Longhi in their cross-cutting analysis of existing data on attitudes towards immigrants found out also that an increase in the regional unemployment rate of immigrants and the percentage of immigrants born outside the EU are both associated with increased concerns in the population over the impact of immigration on the country. Differences in anti-immigration attitudes across regions in Europe may not be as closely related to the current economic conditions of the region, as they might be driven by concerns over the conditions of the immigrant population in that region, in addition to an overall inflated estimation of the extent of immigration (Markaki and Longhi 2012: 19). This findings are probably the closest explanation how the attitudes of the Polish natives to foreigners were shaped and changed over the years.

In our own work (Bulandra and Kościótek, 2014: 75-76) we have distinguished three particular dimensions that are linked to Polish natives' attitudes to foreigners. First one is social, measured by the level of society openness, its tolerance and direct social contacts. The second one is political, and it is shaped by the type or model of migration policy in its both legal and practical dimension. The third one is the level of obedience to the rule of law and international standards, as well as governmental plans and actions against discrimination, racism and other xenophobic behaviours. While analysing connections between official migration policy and public opinion we have found that institutionalized xenophobia, present on the governmental level, then incorporated into the practical dimension of migration policy and reflected also in the legal system caused the rise of hostile attitudes against migrants in Polish society. Further literature and research review, made for this particular report showed that presently this connection become deeper, causing unprecedented drop in acceptance of foreigners as a social group.

In order to understand however what happened and how it happened we needed to look back into the last two decades of the twentieth century. If we look into the general public consciousness, Polish people at the very symbolic level perceived the nation as tolerant and open to others, referring to the historical perspective, when Poland was very diverse and multicultural country, providing shelter to Jews and other ethnical and religious groups persecuted all over the Europe between fourteenth and eighteenth centuries. This perception is however largely mythological. The openness is more postulated value and present in the attitudes declaratively that was proved by numerous research measuring the level of distance to immigrants in Poland (Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami UW, 2009: 19, 25). In the public poll on the perception of foreigners' it was revealed that there is large discrepancy between acceptances of different nations. The reluctance is more linked to religious and cultural difference than to the nationality. As acceptance of different values and opinions is perceived as better indicator of the openness than acceptance of innate features (nationality) Polish people is scored low in such research (CBOS, 2007, CBOS, 2011: 6). As Nowicka commented this does not refer to race which creates the visible difference. In the view of Polish, Africans as clearly other by appearance were perceived extremely alien and for that reason excluded from the typical social roles, such as partners, colleagues or

blood donors (Nowicka, 2004: 206). For the last decades of twentieth century the Polish attitudes towards migrants had been also driven by the stereotypes linked to West-East division, European community belongings and historical and cultural bias towards Germans, Jews and Roma.

In another public poll we, and Other Space Foundation have ordered in PBS statistical research platform for the first migration forum in Krakow in 2013, it was revealed that two thirds of the locals did not want more migrants in Poland and perceived migration as a threat. Polish people also did not value the positive sides of migration such as alleviating the demographic crisis (62% did not accept this advantage), cultural and social enrichment (60.6%), intellectual contribution to country's development (53.1 %), creation of intercultural families (54.2%). As many as 68.8 percent of Polish people thought that Poland could not afford to provide aid to Africans, Asians and East Europeans, 63.9 percent thought that migrants would endanger the jobs and labour market stability, 55.5 percent perceived migrants as source of conflicts and security threat, 56.7 percent were feared that national unity would be broke (Bulandra and Kościótek, 2014: 79).

This stability of the xenophobic attitudes, resistant to social changes, progressive movements and more intensive contacts with larger numbers of foreigners was explained by Okólski and Grzymała-Kazłowska by reference to mono-ethnicity of the Polish nation after the WW2 and lack of opportunity to engage in social relations with foreigners. This was facilitated by the governmental propaganda exploiting the anti-German resentments, anti-Semitism and unintentionally, anti-Soviet attitudes by forcing the brotherly friendship between socialist countries (Grzymała-Kazłowska and Okólski, 2003: 31-32). As Pilch noted the level of tolerance is a result of the personal awareness, knowledge and set of features connected to the upbringing model. If the knowledge is advanced, person have more information on certain object, then potentially one is more tolerant (Pilch, 2001: 67-70). Unfortunately, Polish schools and education system as general never offered any type of intercultural or civic education. If such classes had been organized it was always local initiative of the teachers and headmasters in certain schools. The tolerance teaching and anti-discrimination education were never part of the school curriculum except the short period between 2015 and 2017, however such recommendation had not been operationalized for certain subjects or workshops to be conducted in the schools. Issue of interculturalism, multiculturalism, anti-racism and xenophobia prevention does not exist as topics in the governmental standards for the education of teachers and their competence elevation (Abramowicz, 2011: 22). The EVS study in 1990 and 1999 showed that the level of xenophobia raised significantly, and Polish people stand out from other European nations in their opinions about migrants' arrival (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2002: 192-194). After the accession to European Union enthusiasm following this event caused a slow but progressive rise in acceptance of migrants in the society. This effect was however smaller than expected which was explained again by type of migration policy (strict and controlling) and concentration of the migrants in larger cities, which led to greater anonymity and melting process within the society (Wencel and Klaus 2010: 58). Some blame could have been ascribed to media, which in the last decade of the twentieth century pictured migrants as intruders, threat to national security or criminals. Most were described as collective group and rare individual stories had negative context (Mrozowski 1997: 7, 35). Migrants had to wait until Polish accession to EU to read or see positive stories in mass media. Threat and problems were replaced then, in the media discourse, by integration issues and success stories. These new narratives helped to build better perception of the foreigners in Poland

but showed also that Polish people's attitudes towards migrants are labile and can be easily influenced by media reports, especially negative ones, describing foreigners as those who stepped against the cultural norms or taboos. The state of art analysis in the period preceding "migration crisis" proved that discrimination and xenophobia were stronger at the symbolic level and got representation in people's behaviours, violence and hate speech. It is important to emphasize, as Nikitorowicz argued, that in multicultural societies conflict is not dependent to the revealed or existing differences but occurring processes of democratization, getting known each other, mutual understanding and dialogue with otherness as condition of one's development. (Nikitorowicz, 2010: 367-368). This process might be interrupted by media propaganda or political statements that inspire hate, racism or xenophobia. This is particularly important in times, when social dialogue in Poland is now undermined by the deep political, social and cultural divisions within the society that started to form yet before the refugee crisis. This division lies between so called liberal and conservative part of the society, where the first one is perceived or self-called as progressive and elite and second one as backward and uneducated. Division is so deep that both groups began to build the identity around those simplifications. This conservative part of the society tend to be more xenophobic as the research showed. There was a strong link identified between symbolic patriotic identity, national martyrdom and lack of acceptance towards foreigners. The strong belief that nation was permanently harmed combined with the fear of eternal enemies led to aversion and distrust against the other (Skarżyńska, 2017:48). With such an attitude cultural integrity and perception of uniqueness support xenophobic beliefs and behaviours leading to opinion that discrimination is rightful, because Polish people are superior to others. This was particularly underlined by one of our experts, who we interviewed, and from her point of view such beliefs became common within Polish society affecting children and undermining the integration process in schools. To exemplify this problem we may recall that for many years Polish was calling Blacks as Negros (murzyn) until Blacks did not become part of the society and opposed to this word. This word had been however perceived as culturally accustomed and opponents of the political correctness refused to follow, with the argumentation that subjective will of the minorities cannot lead to the change of language conventions. Such changes is up to this day perceived by conservatives as cultural war and breach of the freedom of expression (Kasprzak, 2012, Kowalski, 2010: 238-239). Freedom of speech became in Poland one of the major justifications to use hateful expressions against certain social groups including migrants. Such defence of hate speech had been supported both by conservative publicist such as Rafał Ziemkiewicz and later, by politicians, including leader of the current ruling party – Jarosław Kaczyński. This concept was first introduced by Kaczyński in his speech in the "Polish Flag Commemoration Day" on 2nd May of 2016 when he said that "political correctness destroyed the freedom of expression in the West. We will not adopt any laws on hate speech prevention aimed to eliminate this freedom. Poland must remain and will always remain the Isle of freedom." Such political statements always led to acquiescence for the more vulgar and more hateful behaviors, especially in social media (examples will be discussed further on). Cultural integrity however, could not have excused Polish who was creating new insulting names for foreigners, especially Brown people (Indian, Pakistani, Afghani, Arab) such as "ciapak", "ciapaty", "arabus", "szmatogłowy", "pastowaniec",

“muzol”¹⁴ that never existed before in Polish language and culture and was made up by Polish emigration in United Kingdom.

This what happened with Polish discourse on migration issues after 2015 was mostly inspired by the publications in the Polish conservative and right wing press. Between October 2014 and July 2015, INTERKULTURALNI PL Association, in partnership with the Dialog-Pheniben Foundation carried out work on the diagnosis of hate speech, which is present in media discourse and resulting from the opinions of journalists themselves, or as part of reporting on actions and statements made by Polish politicians. Our cross-sectional study at the first part of diagnosis of public hate speech phenomena confirmed a sustainable trend, showing that the highest level of hate speech primarily affects sexual minorities and Jews, and increasingly Muslims, Roma, and uncertain number of individuals, who contributed positively to develop the idea of gender studies or the supporters of such idea. There was also visible decrease in levels of hate speech against black people, as racism slightly changed its character, pointing at people of Asian (Pakistani, Afghani) or Arabic origin, often bound inextricably with the issue of Islamophobia (Bulandra, Kościótek and Zimnoch, 2015:23-48). Our further quantitative research that was conducted on raw material delivered by Press-Service media monitoring group, containing of 26 501 articles had been finished in April, 2015. As a result, three groups were selected, towards which there had been found the highest rate of co-occurrence of expressions characteristic to hateful language within the close range of words, defining social groups covered by the survey. These were sexual minorities, Muslims and Jews. The analysis was performed using statistical software tools, based on computerized analysis of the words and their compounds within tested texts. This study was then followed by the qualitative analysis of the randomly selected press texts. The query performed showed that hate speech in media was governed by certain features like: overrepresentation of certain newspapers in the discourse on migrants, Jews or Muslims, frequent repetition of the names of journalists who were the authors of hateful texts like Rafał Ziemkiewicz, Jan Bodakowski, Stanisław Michalkiewicz, Marian Miszalski, Piotr Zychowicz, Marcin Wolski, Tomasz Sommer, and Piotr Lisiewicz. This showed that phenomenon of hate speech was spreading not because of the universality of its prevalence in the press, but due to relatively small circle of people with certain views, hired by media. Unfortunately those people were enough prominent to inspire outburst of hateful comments, memes, and other creativity in the social media. The link between those two was clear within our analysis as the same arguments that had been sold in the press had been then followed in social media. These, in the reference to migration issues, was mostly based on islamophobia and concentrated around the issues of terrorism, inability of Muslim to assimilate in the Western countries, cultural and religious crusade of the Islam, collapse of the European civilization, crimes committed by people who was perceived as Muslims, or victimization narratives, showing that Muslims are treated better than other groups for the reason of the racism libel threat (Bulandra, Kościótek and Zimnoch, 2015: 90-198). This narrative soon become the mainstream one and was found to be the major cause of the Polish people reluctance to accept any refugee quota in the relocation mechanism, despite


¹⁴ It is very hard to provide English equivalent for such words: „ciapaty” comes from chapati – Indian bread, but in Polish language means also paint chopping, or stained; arabus is equivalent of Arab but with angry emotional stress; szmatogłowy means that someone wears rag in the head, but refers also to indecent people worth nothing, pastowaniec, refers to the wordplay – it has connection to Pakistani, but also shepherd and bootblack; muzol again refers to Muslim but with the angry emotional stress.

the fact, that yet two years earlier (2014-2015) in the public opinions' polls 72 percent of Polish people accepted the necessity to help asylum seekers (CBOS, 2015).

2. Migration issues in public discourse after the "refugee crisis"

Strengthen of anti-immigration attitudes arose not only with so called refugee crisis but also with the shift of power in Poland when liberal, centric government was replaced by populist and conservative government of the Law and Justice party. New government changed its social and cultural narrative, not only by being openly anti-immigrant or migration sceptic, but also by creation of the new type of patriotism – based on anticommunism, cultural integrity, ethnic purity and conservative Catholicism. This new vision of Polish, probably unintentionally incorporated several worst features such as aggressive nationalism or ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants or persons with migration backgrounds. This last category was particularly important in this discourse as searching for the "roots" of people (usually Jewish) to whom hatred comments are directed is one of the most common hate speech patterns in Poland. These waves of anti-Semitism are observed each time some affairs referring to Jewish heritage in Poland or Israeli foreign policy statements are revealed. The recent outburst had been connected to diplomatic conflict with Israel caused by the amendment of the National Institute of Remembrance law in 2018, penalizing the public accusations of Polish involvement in Holocaust. In numerous online comments, articles and public statements Polish Jews suffered from verbalized exclusion processes causing them to fear or feel anxious (Newsweek, 2018). Any kind of the historical problems might create the source of nationalistic conflict. This can be easily applied to Polish-Ukrainian relations, where Wołyń (Volyn) genocide in 1943-1944 and reprisal shortly after the WW2, the historical judgment of Stepan's Bandera heritage had become a seed of discrimination, hate speech and violence in relations between Ukrainian immigrants and some Polish people. These two examples show another characteristics of the Polish hate speech – incitement by the certain events. When Polish 800 meters run athlete was defeated again by Caster Semenya on World Athletics Championships we have witnessed another outburst of homophobic and racial slurs against transgender people, women and Blacks. The ease of the hate incitement among Polish people, especially by media broadcast, caused an unprecedented drop in migrants' perception in Polish society after the Law and Justice came into power. Migrants, asylum seeker and refugees became the first victims of cultural war that government provoked. Between 2015 and 2017 day by day the public television's main news program "Wiadomości" delivered xenophobic and racist stories on these groups of people leading to aforementioned drop in the acceptance of asylum seekers (72 vs. 39%) shown just six month after the previous poll (CBOS, 2016). In this poll only four percent of the respondents allowed acceptance and settlement of the asylum seekers on the territory of Poland. In the most recent study of the European Council on Foreign Relations Polish identified foreigners of three different categories (Muslims, migrants and Russians) as the biggest threat to Europe. In this study the result was distorted by men as for women mostly climate changes and nationalism are the biggest threat for the modern societies.

What is the single biggest threat to Europe today?



Furthermore Polish people are one of the most distrustful nation towards others, open to conspiracy theories, nativism and populism (see table on page 12 from the Ipsos Study on societies political attitudes in different parts of the World in 2019)



Agreement with Statements – Overall Summary

	Argentina	Australia	Belgium	Brazil	Canada	Chile	France	Germany	Great Britain	Hungary	India	Israel	Italy	Japan	Malaysia	Mexico	Peru	Poland	Russia	Saudi Arabia	Serbia	South Africa	South Korea	Spain	Sweden	Turkey	United States	
	Global Total																											
The System Is Broken	[Country's] society is broken	54%	74%	47%	78%	52%	57%	46%	63%	66%	40%	25%	34%	32%	54%	61%	63%	84%	64%	24%	63%	78%	43%	69%	49%	46%	60%	
	The [Country's] economy is rigged to advantage the rich and powerful	70%	76%	66%	75%	67%	73%	73%	69%	70%	78%	69%	72%	66%	57%	79%	78%	65%	76%	n/a	76%	69%	72%	77%	50%	66%	66%	
	Traditional parties and politicians don't care about people like me	66%	74%	64%	72%	61%	73%	75%	60%	69%	73%	68%	49%	67%	57%	76%	75%	71%	72%	n/a	65%	78%	64%	75%	50%	60%	67%	
	To fix [Country], we need a strong leader willing to break the rules	49%	44%	50%	53%	39%	42%	77%	22%	52%	35%	72%	58%	62%	44%	42%	41%	45%	62%	50%	n/a	31%	51%	62%	31%	36%	64%	35%
Populism	[Country] needs a strong leader to take the country back from the rich and powerful	64%	67%	67%	73%	67%	62%	65%	38%	70%	68%	80%	66%	59%	46%	68%	79%	74%	57%	67%	n/a	57%	69%	64%	67%	41%	60%	66%
	Experts in this country don't understand the lives of people like me	62%	75%	63%	59%	62%	70%	72%	57%	67%	65%	61%	40%	62%	55%	56%	73%	68%	66%	54%	n/a	58%	67%	59%	71%	47%	63%	65%
Nativism	Immigrants take important social services away from real [Nationality]	43%	49%	43%	37%	41%	46%	45%	39%	40%	49%	41%	42%	25%	60%	44%	50%	26%	45%	38%	54%	48%	32%	43%	34%	67%	42%	
	When jobs are scarce, employers should prioritize hiring people of this country over immigrants	60%	65%	53%	51%	50%	54%	49%	48%	75%	63%	69%	53%	53%	81%	69%	62%	65%	81%	52%	82%	63%	60%	52%	34%	73%	55%	
	[Country] would be better off if we let in all immigrants who wanted to come here	15%	17%	15%	19%	11%	18%	8%	17%	13%	7%	35%	12%	12%	11%	12%	13%	22%	12%	6%	27%	5%	12%	9%	15%	17%	14%	22%

It is no surprise however if we analyze the content of national media's broadcast on migrants. Maybe the most meaningful example is the TVP News report on Ramadan (Wiadomości TVP, 2017). In three minutes long video showing different manifestations of the Muslim's presence in Europe, mostly violent and criminal, authors tried to convince that Muslim immigrants are becoming threat for Europe not only as terrorists but also due to assimilation failure. It is clearly emphasized that Muslims are invading Europe. It is all placed in the context of Ramadan – the holy months in Islam that had, in the view of the report authors' quite different face. They convince that during the feast's month radicals became more active committing fifty five terrorist attacks in which more than five hundred people were killed. This information is followed by the "expert" statement who declared that Islamic State leader is promising paradise to martyrs and each infidel killed during Ramadan counts thousand times more in heaven. After this, the collage of "Muslim" crimes are shown, mostly fake ones, like the French comedian performance in alcohol shop, here threatened with full attention. At the end, Muslims dancing on the streets of UK city are shown as the manifestation of the future evil. The commentators are saying that tolerance is understood in the wrong way, blind political correctness created the space for radical Islamists and only bringing back the Christian values might be the rightful cure. Otherwise Europeans will not be hosts in their own homes anymore.

All such reports were made with the same pattern. Xenophobic narration and visions, usually put out of the context are supported by the statements of different experts – usually conservative ones, and those who criticize Islam or migration flows. Then the crimes of migrants are mentioned and the weakness and helplessness of Western politicians in response to radicalization are underlined. Polish opposition is criticized for their will to agree to accept the relocation quotas.

Such ongoing public media propaganda can be linked to unprecedented and never observed before rise of violence against migrants in Poland. Only the official police statistics showed that in 2015 there was 337 hate crimes recorded and yet next year there had been 1635 such crimes. That was only the tip of the iceberg as the media monitoring revealed that over one hundred verbal or physical attacks on foreigners were reported in Polish media daily (Sojda, 2017). Not only were foreigners the victims of the xenophobic violence but also those who helped them or Polish people who spoke loudly other languages. In their aggression offenders often recalls to cultural integrity, demanding the acceptance of so called Polish values or obligation to speak Polish language on the streets. Skarżyńska argues that such effect occurred because both in public media and in official governmental narration there is clear tendency to locate historical accent in martyrdom and in opposition to the neighboring countries (Russia and Germany), but also European Union, that is seen as primary evil. Skarżyńska deducts that nationalist radicalization is connected with the need to improve the self-confidence of the individuals characterized by the low resource of the social capital and with compensation of individual deficits (Skarżyńska, 2017: 48). The sudden rise of nationalistic attitudes and behavior, often symbolically manifested, together with evident drop of acceptance to migration movements is associated with the official governmental propaganda – patriotic on the one hand (getting up from knees ethos) and anti-immigrant on the other. This propaganda is highly xenophobic but spread with parallel assurance of the respect to migrants who work hard, assimilate and accept our cultural values.

As the example of such statement we may refer to the speech of Jarosław Kaczyński who was scaring the voters on the rally in Maków Mazowiecki, with Platforma Obywatelska (Civic

Platform political party) secret pact with EU to accept hundred thousands of Muslims in Poland. According to the politician the right person to answer the question if we shall accept asylum seekers is the Ministry of Health as this is the issue of the health safety. He then referred to the occurrence of highly dangerous diseases, not seen in Europe for the long time. He mentioned cholera on Greek Islands, dysentery in Vienna, different kind of parasites, protozoans that are not dangerous in the bodies of those people but might be dangerous here. He concluded that it cannot lead to any discrimination however it must be checked. This statement was made just before the election's day in 2015.

In the local election campaign in 2018 the Law and Justice party made also highly xenophobic movie in which natives were threatened that win of the Civic Platform will lead to immigrants ghettos in their cities, spread of violence and terrorism (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2018). In the short video we see the long queues in the border, people in sanitary masks, person kicking someone off the stairs in metro, riots, burning cars, and attack in Nice followed by the opposition's politicians holding banners "Refugees welcome".

On the other hand government on every occasion denies being anti-immigrant, xenophobic or racist. Defending the Polish refusal to accept the asylum seekers quota in 2016 Beata Szydło told in the European Parliament that Poland accepted one million refugees from Ukraine. She referred this way to Ukrainian labour immigrants coming to Poland, but exploited the context of the Donetsk and Crimea wars to convince EU officials that Poland does not avoid its international obligations. In fact in 2015, only two Ukrainian asylum seekers were granted refugee status in Poland. The official governmental narration can be perceived as schizophrenic because other prominent PiS parliamentarian – Dominik Tarczyński in the interview with Cathy Newman for the British Channel 4 told her that Poland as a country is safe because it is not accepting illegal Muslim immigrants. On her question how many asylum seekers Poland let in, he replied "zero" and promised that "not even one Muslim will enter Poland", which obviously does not correspond with any facts (Voice of Europe, 2018). Surprisingly enough, against its own propaganda current government opened the borders for foreigners for the unprecedented scale and this inflow include the foreigners from predominantly Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Egypt, Algeria, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan. This policy is completely contradictory to the official statements as both prime ministers Beata Szydło and Mateusz Morawiecki claimed that Poland will not be accepting immigrants from Middle East and North Africa. The current migration reality is hidden by the government and since the end of 2018 migration agenda again returned on the margin of the political discourse. It was replaced by other evil – the LGBT lobby and organizations. The absence of the migrants in the political agenda in 2019 did not improved their picture in the society's opinion. Polish exceptionalism that is being built on nationalistic beliefs, Slavic heritage and conservative Catholicism was still strong and supported by governmental party politicians, other right-wing parties but also by the conservative bishops in the Polish Roman Catholic Church. Despite ambivalent church position on migrants, where believers are officially encourage by the congregation of bishops to provide aid to asylum seekers and show them compassion, the lower clergy present anti-immigration attitudes and spread them among the faithful (Pędziwiatr, 2018: 462, 469-471). Unfortunately even some prominent catholic figures present racist and supremacist attitudes in their official accounts. The Archbishop of Krakow and Vice President of Polish Episcopate Marek Jędraszewski in his lecture on atheism and relation between faith and science delivered in the Holyest Saint Rosemary Church in Pabianice (Łódź region) he made the following statement: "I can easily imagine, that soon, I hope that I will

personally won't live it, that in 2050 may be, a few Whites will be shown to other human races – here on the European territory – such as Indians are shown in the reserves in the United States. There were such people in the past, who lived here, but extinct on their own wish, because they could not accept who they are biologically" (VOX24.PL, 2019). Such unacceptable comments are often made without any perception of its wrongfulness. They are acceptable as being supportive in cultural war with the left who are associated with gender, LGBT, and migrants. People who does not accept the presence of these groups in the country agree to build alliances with extreme right-wing groups. In their discourse the accusation of fascism is indeed the attack on the traditional values (Ciesek, 2015: 168). Ciesek observes that contemporary public discourse in Poland is being built on the Latin Christian civilization cult. It means the acceptance of norms and rules of the society worked out throughout the centuries both in the public and private, family sphere. The nationalistic discourse, appreciating the significance of the Latin, and particularly Slavic culture, put emphasis on the intellectual achievements: scientific, or technological. The progress that brings development, but with the respect to tradition, and national distinction is appraised as being in the line with the concept of work for the welfare of the homeland. In the symbolic space of ideas and axiology the behavioral patterns of social and cultural life remains unchanged and untouched as part of national and civilizational heritage. This space is closed and heavily protected against any transformations (Ciesek, 2015: 171). Unfortunately the supremacy of the Christian ethos becomes the source of exclusion practices. This ethos is justifying the new government stand on the migration issues. Poland agreed to collaborate with Europe in migration crisis resolution provided it is allowed to choose which migrants deserve to be accepted or relocated to Poland. This was always to be similar people however sameness was defined on very superficial level of religious, ethnical and race kinship. Nevertheless in case of Syria, Poland wanted to limit its commitment to accept refugees who were Christians only.

The conflict around asylum seekers quotas undermined the Polish position in the European Union but led also to the major transformation of the Polish foreign policy. The principle values of the European Union are based on the openness understood as human rights universalism, secularity, individualism, defining national identities in inclusive way (integration of migrants rather than assimilation). Closeness is on the other hand based on the idealization of the nation, preference of the national homogeneity, strong authoritarian ruling, traditionalism, collectivism and distrust to international institutions and capital (Inglehart and Norris, 2016). All those latter features are present in the contemporary public discourse about the Polish presence in the European Union. As Bilewicz notes the polarization between being open and closed is one of the major feature of the political and social reality in Poland. It is almost tribal or sectarian in nature causing clashes and tensions both in the traditional and social media (Bilewicz, 2015). Both groups radicalize and commentators and academics in Poland cannot presently anyhow predict where these division will lead and how to end or at least allay them. What is surprising for the group who oppose the liberal or so called post materialistic values it is still supporting Polish presence in the European Union and the freedom of movement within the Schengen zone. This acceptance is not unconditional as most of the Polish oppose the greater integration and support reforms of the EU that would bring back most competences to nation states (Stokes, 2016). Polish people prefer the subsidiary form of EU involvement and do not accept any instruments that would limit the sovereignty of state, such as euro or common EU military. In this context, surprisingly low number of Poles (21 percent) sees the human rights protection as the priority goal of foreign policy. Such sceptic, generalized attitude to the

human rights construction may explain the moderately hostile attitude to migrants in the present day. The other important factors are: the country homogeneity (lowest rate of foreign inhabitants among EU countries) and traditional conservatism.

3. Representations of migrants in media and social perception.

As it was already discussed migrants and migration issues for many years were not part of any important public discussions. Polish people rarely had an occasion to speak about or read about foreigners. This however changed slightly after the Poland's accession to EU, and quite recently again, after the shift of power in 2015. Since then, the refugee crisis was exploited by the public media and government as element of the petrification of the Law and Justice authority. This narrations was predominantly negative and xenophobic.

Apart from the general opinion polls on the attitudes toward migrants there were not so much publications on how migrants are presented in the press or in the public discourse (Jura, and Kałużńska, 2013: 7). Grzymała-Kazłowska however formulated five hypotheses that governs drawing the pictures of the migrants in the press and other media. The more migrants arrive there is a rise in the occurrence of this topic in the media. This lead to materialization of the otherness description in the media. It became more complex, multidimensional as the effect of media pluralism. The second hypothesis refers to aforementioned polarization of opinions. In conservative media and tabloids we will find predominant negative descriptions basing on stereotypes while in liberal media narrations will be driven by political correctness and tolerance. The media discourse is more and more systematic and consistent depending of the type of publisher (tabloid or opinion-forming). The way of portraying migrants is also influenced by the Western cultural patterns, norms and dialects. Finally narration will be dominated by cultural stereotypes on certain nations and imaginations of the migrants in similar social and professional roles (Grzymała-Kazłowska, 2007). These hypotheses proved to be correct, however it had been recently distorted by the homogenous, and clearly xenophobic discourse present in the public media between 2015-2017. It was also proved that public opinion is manipulated by the media broadcasters and a great number of the migrants' representations are fake or taken out of its context. The reports are increasingly selected to prove certain thesis and are far from objectivity.

In the discussion about the migrants' presence in Poland we may select several patterns. Migrants are perceived as those who are bringing economic benefit or economical threat to the hosting society. Such discussions are focused around issues of unemployment, economic development, civilizational advancement, cultural enrichment. Another representation refers to European integration. Recently there is visible overrepresentation of the terrorism threat in the migration discourse. Media representations of the foreigners in this context caused identification of Muslims only with terrorism by the majority of the Polish (Fundacja Afryka Inaczej, 2015). Another pattern refers to the attitudes of the host society and Polish exclusionism and xenophobia. In these representations Poland shall be inhabited purely by Polish people and foreigners are portrayed as intruders and unwelcomed. The last representation reconsiders the patterns of the migrants' presence in Poland. Most of the papers, articles and reports here argue that for most migrants Poland is just a short stop in their migration experience. Quite different representations could be met in the description of the migration issues in the context of the Western countries. Polish

media refers here to the problem of age progression in the European countries, cultural threat and expansion of Islam, the rise of political radicalism and populism affecting the migrants' treatment or to the humanitarianism. Finally we may find the representations referring to the migrants' countries of origin. These are mostly the individual stories, reports and essays on problems and affairs in such countries, description of conflicts or references to more global problems that are affecting the migration movements.

All those representations are present and reconsidered in the Polish media in four different perspectives. The multicultural one praise the cultural diversity, tries to explain the negative events and integration problems with the use of social exclusion models and generally create positive representations of migrants. It often refers to the activity of non-governmental organizations and social activism. This perspective underlines the importance of the European cooperation and good practices exchange. We may however find also a state perspective where emphasis is given to inability to include migrants in political process unless they assimilate or gain the citizenship. This perspective is linked strictly with the governmental migration policy and present the governmental position on the migration issues. Currently this type of perspective is xenophobic and anti-immigrant. It is supported by the ethno-nationalistic perspective that describe the World as collapsing, mainly due to the invasion of the migrants into the European countries. A dichotomy between natives and foreigners are drawn. Migrants are unwelcome and evil. Some narratives in this perspective allows the possibility to provide institutional, development and humanitarian aid in the countries of origin but only as a tool to stop migration. In this perspective we find overrepresentation of the hate speech and white supremacy, treating migrants from Global South as less developed and uncivilized. The last perspective is the most diverse. It was called by Grzymała-Kazłowska as sensational and deviational. This covers different, usually individual stories from the regions and local communities, where migrants are described in the context of exotics, folklore, family life, crimes and other unspecified representations.

In our own research on hate speech in media that was conducted in 2014 we made a qualitative review of over 350 out of 1914 articles about Muslims present in the Polish press between January and December 2014 (Bulandra, Kościółek and Zimnoch, 2015: 90-115). Furthermore in 2015 we reviewed the raw data again to find out more on the representations of the asylum seekers and the refugees and Roma people in the press that time.

The descriptions of Islam as the religion, political and social system are concentrating around several issues. It is argued that Islam in fact is not a belief but intrusive and authoritarian political system. It is also opposed to Christianity. In the political context of Islam, Muslims are perceived as those who tend to dominate European cultures and transform them according to the rules set by Prophet. The conflict between Christians and Muslims dominated the media discourse in 2014 and referred to social and ethnical relations in Nigeria, Central African Republic, Sudan, South Sudan, Libya, Iraq and Syria. Christians were described as victims, persecuted and brutally killed by the Muslim radicals. No Muslim victims were frequently present in this discourse. The presence of the Muslims in Europe were almost completely associated with the terrorist threat. Islam, its believers were described in the context of fundamentalism. Moderate Muslims, not mentioning progressive ones were non-existent. The separate group of representations touched the problem of Islamophobia in the Western societies. In Poland press underlined the weakness of the Western reaction to cultural expansion of the Muslims. They convinced that all problems were linked to the political correctness that was placing discrimination in the

fields where it had not been present and allowed Islamic radicals to push the border of the social acceptance to their own cultural and moral values- alien to Western progressive societies. The conservatism of Islam sometimes was seen as an ally in the cultural war with Western moral decay, especially gender ideology, sexual minorities, abortion and euthanasia.

Some part of the reports were devoted to the different conflicts around the World. It is interesting that reports on the Israeli and Palestinian conflict were more Arabic-friendly and if lack of objectivity was at stake, the relation was rather anti-Semitic, not anti-Arabic or anti-Islamic.

In the rare positive representations of the Muslim, Polish press focused on the cultural transformations of the Arab countries, political change and activism connected to Arab Spring and reception of the Western cultural patterns in the Middle East countries. Some articles were showing Islamic culture, discuss the sport, economic or pop culture issues.

The narration on the asylum seekers we have found in the press reports and articles in 2014 were driven either by fear and threat or the compassionate individual stories. The latter ones were however singular. There was a larger concept made up that most of the asylum seekers are in fact economic migrants ready to exploit Western social security systems and live for benefits at host society expense. Furthermore such immigrants, often staying illegally in the host country or being undocumented, which makes impossible to expel them, did not integrate with the locals. Moreover, they forced their customs and culture on unprepared for such invasion and over-tolerant Western societies. In Poland it was much exploited that French, British or German immigrant ghettos are results of migrants' natural-born features and customs, lack of integration will, and are not caused by social exclusion and discrimination practices. If asylum seekers profess Islam they automatically creates a threat to European and Western values. Secularization process in this religion were not observed in the press discourse. Furthermore the Islamic religion is accustomed with every asylum seeker or migrant coming from the Arab or Asian countries with Muslim majority. There are no Muslim converters, apostates or atheists according to Polish press publications. Another sort of articles refers to aid provided for refugees and asylum seekers. It was argued that our society cannot afford acceptance of the larger groups of migrants or provide aid to asylum seekers as we are still unable to resolve country's own poverty problem. Next plot reconsiders terrorist threat connected to asylum seekers influx even though there was no asylum seekers among terrorists that time. Very interesting thread was linked to opinion that only ex-colonial countries should have been responsible for the migration crisis, and they had been obliged to resolve that problem on their own. Some perspectives, not as rare as it could have been expected, are basing on conspiracy theories. In such narrations George Soros and Western elites are responsible for the global migration crises. The aims behind these are very diverse, from economic perspectives to cultural ones, with particular emphasis on NWO theories. Some bizarre representations combined Western left elites (particularly German) with the will to Islamize Europe as part of anti-Christian crusade that was promoting also pedophilia, abortion and homosexuality. In this rhetoric Western left hated Christians as they opposed the progression and transformation of social values.

In the parallel report from the same period (Jura and Kałużyńska, 2013: 14-53) we could found the description of the representations of the Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Vietnamese, Chinese, Chechens, Arabs, Roma, Muslims and Blacks. The results revealed that

Roma, Arabs and Muslims were presented in the clear negative manner, especially in the internet. The research conformed also our own observation that conservative and right-wing media tended to concentrate on certain migration issues and certain nationalities. In the Jura and Kałużyńska research there was overrepresentation of the articles dedicated to our neighbors. Ukrainians were portrayed frequently as nationalists relating to the legacy of Stepan Bandera and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army), who inspired and conducted genocide of Polish inhabitants in Volyn region during the WW2. This narratives were negative and hostile. It occurred more often than discourse relating to German Nazism. People were blamed for this historical event, called insensitive to the Polish historical perspective. At the same time those journalists claimed that due to the genocide occurrence Ukrainians did not have any moral right to build their national identity around Bandera and UPA's heritage. As usual, the historical truth and context are not so unequivocal.

Generally the representations of the migrants in the traditional and social media are interconnected. Both Worlds are presently citing each other, however most often the information delivered by the traditional media is repeated in the social media and strengthen by interaction of the commentators. The emotional stress in the internet is much higher and most of representatives are not objective. Social media representations tend to be also more negative and aggressive towards migrants in comparison to the traditional media reports. Fake news are frequent and dominant in social media. Stereotypes and prejudices are exploited becoming the cultural factor in internet broadcasts (memology). The negative representations of migrants in social media are often hardcore. For instance Arabs are portrayed as brutal killers, zoophiles (goatfuckers or sheepfuckers), pedophiles and cowards who use women and children as life-shields.

After the 2015 general elections and takeover of the power by the Law and Justice party government started to use public media to distribute the favorable propaganda in different fields of social and political agenda. As the party came into power using anti-immigrant rhetoric and its opposition to the EU enforced refugees quotas the continuation of anti-immigrant narration in public media become the daily issue between 2015 -2017 when the problem was replaced by the gender, LGBT and sexual education problems. These representations never before were more hostile, xenophobic or racist. The asylum seekers and undocumented migrants were openly presented as terrorists, criminals who persecute natives, people invading culturally the hosting countries, and even as the savage gangs of brutal invaders who attack the border posts in large groups, burn the refugees' camps and incite riots. After the short break between 2018 and 2019 this narrative returned to public television just before the current general elections that will be held on the 13th of October 2019. Again the fear against migrants is used by the government as a tool for reaching their political goals and reelection. Voters are scared that vesting the power to opposition will lead to Islamization of Poland, importing terrorism, destruction of Polish families, homosexual marriages and adoption of children by gays and lesbians. The Ministry of Justice is co-organizing and gives his patronage to the academic conference exploring the connection between migration and crime that is going to be held just four days before Election Day. This all happened despite the fact that unprecedented presence of the migrants in large numbers within the territory of Poland is an effect of the governmental ad hoc migration policy. This migration reality is willingly silenced both by public media and government itself.

The last important indication in the relation to the media representation of migrants is that the certain portrait is dependent not on the individual or group features but are driven

by the particular needs of those in power. Their attitude is strictly instrumental. Whenever necessary, Ukrainians can be named hard workers supporting Polish economy or asylum seekers accepted due to the war situation. This generally leads to conclusion that migrants are not partners of such discourse but become the passive subject of it.

4. Conclusions

The overall political and media discourse on migration in Poland is mixed and complex. The migration problems were never part of the central and most vital problems in political debate. Polish people do not have much interest in foreigners and their problems. In certain periods migration debates are gaining however popularity. This usually accompany general or local elections or certain political events, like EU summits or massive refugee influx. Polish people do not have any solid attitudes toward migrants and are vulnerable to propaganda and manipulations in this regard. The public opinions on migrants fluctuated over the time but the overall output is negative showing the great levels of the xenophobia among Polish people inspired by political and media discourse. This rhetoric is divided between the perspective of openness – friendly towards migrants and closeness – hostile to foreigners. The rise of nationalistic views combined with the official historical narration is supporting isolationists attitudes among natives affecting negatively the integration processes. The deep divisions within the Polish society is not helpful as the polarization is widespread and strengthened by the social media activity and growing frustration among Polish. Migrants are repeatedly excluded, being invisible part of the society, unwelcomed by the larger part of it, instrumentally used and reaped of the rights to be a part of the official discourse. On the other hand there is also large part of the liberal media, liberal politicians and human rights activists that take care and disseminate the positive narrations on migration. This is visible particularly in the local communities where migrants reside. Such support is necessary, justified and enough apparent to provide stability and welfare to arriving migrants. This local perspective is particularly important as it provides an asylum from the national propaganda and hatred present in more symbolic channels of communication.



5. References

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